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I. Introduction 
43 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how users respond to a firm's discretionary 
accounting choices and the auditor's report when these choices match users' expectations 
or not. 
C1or-Proell (2009)巴xamineshow judgments and decisions of financia1 statement users 
are affected by the extent to which a firm's actua1 accounting choices match users' expec-
tations. Although this study examines users' judgment and decisions from the aspect of 
financia1 statements， itdoes not consider the ro1e of the auditor's report. Nonprofessiona1 
users may use information from the auditor's report in addition to the financia1 statements. 
1 have tested the hypotheses of prior studies in the ]apanese experimenta1 settings， but did 
not get similar results; hence， 1 have conducted this experiment to test new hypotheses. 
In the experiment， nonprofessiona1 participants receive information about a hypotheti-
ca1 firm， inc1uding information about its fixed assets. The experiment uses a 1X4 between 
subjects design that varies based on whether the firm's accounting choice matches parti-
cipants' expectations (mismatch with the qualified opinion， mismatch with the emphasis 
of matter paragraph， match， control). Participants rate the credibility of the firm's finan-
cia1 statements， its managers， and i.ts future profitability. They a1so indicate how like1y 
they are to seek additiona1 information about the firm's fixed assets. 
Results from the experiment show that the interaction between actua1 accounting 
choice with the auditor's report and the extent to which it matches expectations affects 
assessments of credibility of financia1 statements， credibility of managers and future prof-
itability. And a1so users' credibility of financia1 statements assessments is 10wer when 
there is a mismatch with the qualified opinion between actua1 and expected accounting 
choice than when there is a mismatch with the emphasis of matter paragraph between 
actua1 and expected accounting choice. 
The Internationa1 Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB， 2012) sets out the 
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indicative direction of the board's future standard-setting proposals to improve the audi-
tor's report in accordance with International Standards on Auditing (ISA). This study is 
likely to indirectly contribute to the board's global emphasis on enhancing the communica-
tive value of the auditor's report on financial statements. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides the background and the 
new hypotheses， Section II describes the experiment method， Section IV states the results 
of the experiment， and Section V provides a summary of the results and discusses certain 
limitations and directions for future research. 
1. Background and Hypotheses 
( 1) Background 
Clor-Proell (2009) considers judgments and decisions of financial statement users from 
the aspect of financial reporting. This study investigates how judgments and decisions of 
financial statement users are affected by the extent to which a firm's actual accounting 
choices match the users' expectations. Based on the expectancy violations theory 
(Burgoon and Burgoon， 2001)， in the field of social psychology， this study predicts and 
finds that users' credibility judgments are more extreme when a firm's actual accounting 
choices do not match their expectations. In a stock-based compensation context， the evi-
dence from the experiment supports the prediction that credibility judgments can mediate 
the effect of a mismatch in relation to investment decisions. In an accounting estimate 
context， results from the experiment partially support the prediction that users who en-
counter a mismatch between actual and expected accounting choices are more likely to 
search for additional information. 
Church et al. (2008) revi巴wsthe auditor's reporting model. This study concludes that 
the auditor's report has symbolic value， even though it provides litle communicative 
value. They assume that confusion stil exists as to the actual content and meaning of the 
auditor's report， although modest improvements have been made in recent years. Further， 
they suggest that the communicative value of the auditor's report can be enhanced by 
inc1uding additional disclosures. 
Loudder et al. (1992) investigates the market's reaction to the auditor's report. Re-
search on the market reaction to the auditor's report provides evidence as to whether the 
auditor's work conveys any useful information to the marketplace. However， this study 
does not show how useful financial reporting (accounting choices)， along with the audi-
tor's report， isto users of financial statements. 
To address this problem， itis first necessary to pay attention to the format of the 
auditor's report. There are differences in the various formats of the auditor's report such 
as an “unqualified report，" a “qualified report，" and an “unqualified report with an emphasis 
of matter paragraph." It is similar to the problem of identifying differences in an income 
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statement or a balance sheet， or disclosures in a footnote. This problem has been identified 
as “information location" by Libby et al. (2006)， and “format effects" by Nelson and Tayler 
(2007) and Hales and Wilks (2012). 
As an experimental study conducted on format effects， Maines and McDaniel (2000) 
examines the effect of alternative presentation formats on nonprofessional investors' proc-
essing of comprehensive-income information; specially， information disclosing the volatil-
ity of unrealized gains on available-for-sale marketable securities. This study shows that 
nonprofessional investors' judgments of corporate and management performance reflect 
the volatility of comprehensive income only when it is presented in a statement of compre-
hensive income. In other words， such information is less likely to affect the judgments of 
financial statements users when provided in a less accessible format like a footnote. 
As per Nelson and Tayler (2007)， transforming financial statements to appear as if 
disclosed information had been recognized may have a greater effect on users' judgments 
than if it had been recognized initialy. That is to say， information has a greater effect on 
users' judgments， when effort was expected to obtain the information and it is displayed in 
a reconciled format. This study focuses on format effects and information pursuits. Hales 
et al. (2012) investigates the informational effects of the unit of account choices in the 
context of the proposed standards for lease accounting. 
Libby et al. (2006) examines whether information in the footnotes might lack reliabil-
ity because auditors permit a comparatively higher level of misstatements in disclosed， as
opposed to recognized， amounts in the stock-compensation and lease settings. This study 
infers that a qualified report influences the judgments and decisions of a financial state-
ment user more than an unqualified report with an emphasis of matter paragraph. 
The previous studies are unable to identify how the difference of accounting choices 
and the auditor's report influences judgments and decisions of financial statements users. 
Further， there is a requirement for additional research to investigate this problem. 
( 2 ) Hypotheses 
The hypotheses of this study are as follows. 
Hl: Users' credibility assessment of financial statements is lower when there is a 
mismatch between the αctual and e，ョcpectedαccountingchoice. Further， users' credi-
bility assessment of financial statements is lower when there is a. mismatch with the 
qualified opinion between the actual and expected accounting choice than when there 
is a mismatch with the emphasis of matter paragraph between the actual and the 
expected αecounting choice. 
H2: Users' credibility assessment of managers is lower when there is a mismatch 
between the actual and the expected accounting choice. Further， users' credibility 
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assessment of mαnαgers is lower when there isαmismatch with the qualified opinion 
between the actual and the expected accounting choice than when there isαmismαtch 
with the emphasis of matter pαrαgraph between the actualαnd the expected account-
ing choice. 
H3: Users' credibilityαssessment of future profitability is lower when there is a mis-
match between the αctual and the e.再pectedaccounting choice. Further， users' credi-
bilityαssessment of future profit，αbility is lower when there is αmismαtch with the 
qualified opinion between the actualαnd the expected accounting choice thαn when 
there isαmismαtch with the emphasis of mαtter paragraph between the αctuα1 and 
the expected αccounting choice. 
H4: A mismatch between the actualαnd the expected αccounting choices results inα 
greαter information search. Further， a mismαtch between the actual and the ex-
pected αccounting choices with the qualified opinion results inαgreater informαtion 
seαrch than when there is a mismatch between the actual and the expected account-
ing choices with the emphasis of matter par，αgr，αph. 
11. Experiment 
( 1) Participants 
The experiment included 104 participants， mainly third year university students in the 
Department of Commercial Science， who registered for the lecture on “audit theory." Elliott 
et al (2007) shows that students are a good proxy for nonprofessional investors. On aver-
age， participants had taken 3.8 accounting classes and were 22 years old， while sixty-four 
percent of them are male. 
(2) Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four treatments available in a 
1 x 4 between subjects design that varies depending on whether the firm's accounting 
choice matches the participants' expectations Cmismatch with the qualified opinion， mis-
match with.the emphasis of matter paragraph， match and controI). 
(3) Materials and Procedure 
The framework of this experiment uses the questionnaire format. It is similar to the 
other experimental studies such as Hunton et al. (2006). As in Kormendi and PloU (1982)， 
monetary incentives were not used in this experiment. A method for influencing grades 
was used to induce preferences. Participants were instructed that incorrect answers may 
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influence their grades. 
First， participants in the cases of match and mismatch with the qualified opinion and 
with the emphasis of matter paragraph were provided with the property， plant， and equip-
ment footnote disclosures from the 2009 annual report of ABC Co. and the auditor's report， 
which helped establish their expectations. Participants in the case of a match (mismatch 
with the qualified opinion and with the emphasis of matter paragraph) are told that the 
firm's fixed assets depreciated by a declining ba1ance method. Therefore， participants in 
the case of a match (mismatch with the qualified opinion and with the emphasis of matter 
paragraph) are to1d to expect the firm to use a declining ba1ance method in the future. 
Second， participants get information from the 2010 annual report of ABC Co. and the 
auditor's report. In the match condition， this information consists of the property， p1ant， 
and equipment footnote， which indicates a declining ba1ance method and the unqualified 
auditor's report. In the case of a mismatch with the qualified opinion， this information 
consists of the property， p1ant， and equipment footnote， which indicates a straight line 
method and the qualified auditor's report. In the case of a mismatch with the emphasis of 
matter paragraph， this information consists of the property， p1ant， and equipment footnote， 
which indicates a straight line method and the unqualified auditor's report with the em-
phasis of matter paragraph. 
Participants in the contro1 condition received no information from the firm's 2010 
annua1 report and the auditor's report. 
After reviewing this information， participants had to respond to manipulation checks. 
Subsequently， al participants had to rate ABC on the credibility of financia1 statements， 
credibility of managers， future profitability， and information search. All participants a1so 
answer questions that examine how like1y they are to seek additiona1 information about 
ABC's fixed-asset. The Steel Test (Stee1， 1960) is used in this experiment as there are four 
groups to compare and the multip1e comparison method is applicab1e. 
( 4 ) Manipulation Checks 
Excluding participants who failed to answer the questions or did not understand them， 
the samp1e size in the case of a mismatch with the qualified opinion was 28 samp1es， inthe 
case of a mismatch with the emphasis of matter paragraph was 25 samp1es， inthe case of 
a match was 19 samp1es， inthe case of contro1 was 15 samp1es， and the tota1 was 87 samples 
obtained from 104 students. 
Answers to the questions to check manipu1ations indicate that manipulations are 
successful. Excluding three samp1es， the rest correctly answered questions on ABC's de-
clining ba1ance method or straight line method; 94.3 percent correctly answered that the 
question re1ates to ABC's depreciation method， 92.0 percent correct1y answered that the 
question re1ates to the credibility of the financial statements， and 91.0 percent correctly 
answered that the question relates to discretionary accounting and future profitability. 
( 142) 
Excluding the participants who failed this manipulation check does not affect the results. 
Therefore， the final analyses include these participants as well. 
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Results IV. 
Hypothesis 1: Users' credibility of financial statements 
、 ，???， ， ? 、
A verage Credibility Ratings TABLE 1 
Panel A: A verage Credibility Ratings 
(4) Control (3) Match (2) Mismatch 
(Emphasis of Matter) 
(1) Mismatch 
(Qualified Opinion) 
6.07 6.37 5.60 4.07 
(note)“Average" means a whole of each item of“knowledgeable，"“competent."“qualified，"“trustworthy，" 
“honest，" and “forthcoming." 
Resu1ts of Steel tests 
Statistic p-value 
Mismatch (Qualified Opinion) < Mismatch -3.2141 権準傘0.0019
(Emphasis of Matter) 
Mismatch (Emphasis of Matter)く Match -4.0760 事略事0.0001
Match < Control -3.5115 本格車0.0007
Panel B: Test of Hl 
•• is 5% significant and ••• is 1 % significant. (note) 
臨Average
Credibility 
Ratings 
A verage Credibility Ratings Figure 1 
????????
???????
Contro¥ Match Mismatch Mismatch 
(QuaIified Opinion) (Emphasis of Matter) 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that users' credibility judgments are more extreme when a mis-
match occurs between the actual and the expected accounting choices. It also predicts that 
users' credibility judgments are more extreme when there is a mismatch with the qualified 
opinion between the actual and the expected accounting choices than when there is a 
mismatch with the emphasis of matter paragraph. 
Average credibility ratings are shown in Table 1， Panel A. As shown in Table 1， Panel 
B， Steel tests with credibility rating as the dependent variable， supports H1. A significant 
interaction between a mismatch with the qualified opinion.and a mismatch with the em-
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phasis of matter paragraph ct = -3.2141， P = 0.0019) indicates that the effect of a mis-
match with the qualified opinion is greater than a mismatch with the emphasis of matter 
paragraph. Steel tests also indicate that a mismatch with the emphasis of matter para-
graph is significant1y lower than a match (t = -4.0760，ρ= 0.0001) and a match is signifi-
cantly lower than a control (t = -3.5115，ρ= 0.0007). 
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Hypothesis 2: Users' credibility of managers (2) 
A verage Credibility Ratings TABLE 2 
Panel A: Av巴rageCredibility Ratings 
(4) Control (3) Match (2) Mismatch 
(Emphasis of Matter) 
(1) Mismatch 
(Qualifi日dOpinion) 
6.27 6.21 5.04 3.39 
Likert scale: 1 (not credible)-5 (somewhat credible)-9 (credible) 
Results of Steel tests 
Statistic p-value 
Mismatch (Qualified Opinion) < Mismatch 3.0061 "'0.0038 
(Emphasis of Matter) 
Mismatch (Emphasis of Matter) < Match 3.8672 "'0.0002 
Match < Control -3.8209 *叫0.0002
Panel B: Test of H2 
判 is5 % significan t and 帥.is 1 %significan t.(note) 
国 Average
Crcdibility 
Ralings 
Average Credibility Ratings Figure 2 
??
????
??
? ? ?
?
?
?
Control Match Mismatch Mismatch 
(Qualified Opinion) (Emphasis of Matter) 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that users' credibility judgments of managers are more extreme 
when a mismatch occurs between the actual and the expected accounting choices. 
A verage credibility ratings are shown in Table 2， Panel A. As shown in Table 2， Panel 
B， Steel tests with credibility rating as the dependent variable supports H2. A significant 
interaction between a mismatch with the qualified opinion and a mismatch with the em-
phasis of matter paragraph ct = -3.0061，ρ= 0.0038) indicates that the effect of a mis-
match with the qualified opinion is greater than a mismatch with the emphasis of matter 
(144 ) 
paragraph. Steel tests also indicate that a mismatch with the emphasis of matter para-
graph is significantly lower than a match (t = -3.8672，ρ= 0.0002) and a match is signifi-
cantly lower than a control (t = -3.8209，ρ= 0.0002). 
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Hypothesis 3: Future Profitability (3 ) 
A verage Future Profitability Ratings 
Panel A: Average Future Profitabi1ity Ratings 
TABLE 3 
(4) ControI (3) Match (2) Mismatch 
(Emphasis of Matter) 
(1) Mismatch 
(QuaIified Opinion) 
5.73 6.05 4.76 3.46 
Likert scale: 1 (not profitable)-5 (somewhat profitable)-9 (profitable). 
Results of Steel tests 
Statistic p-value 
Mismatch (Qualified Opinion) < Mismatch -2.3948 判 0.0230
(Emphasis of Matter) 
Mismatch (Emphasis of Matter)く Match -4.3442 略事事0.0000
Match < Control -3.6304 棉事事0.0004
Panel B: Test of H3 
•• is 5 %signific且ntand ••• is 1% significant. (note) 
蹴 Average
Future 
Profi ta bili ty 
Ratings 
A verage Future Profitability Ratings Figure 3 
??????????
Control Match Mismatch Mismatch 
(Qualified Opinion) (Emphasis of Matter) 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that users' credibility judgments of managers are more extreme 
when a mismatch occurs between the actual and the expected accounting choices. A ver-
age credibility ratings are shown in Table 3， Panel A. As shown in Table 3， Panel B， Steel 
tests with credibility rating as the dependent variable supports H3. A significant interac-
tion between a mismatch with the qualified opinion and a mismatch with the emphasis of 
matter paragraph (t = -2.3948，ρ= 0.0230) indicates that the effect of a mismatch with 
the qualified opinion is greater than a mismatch with the emphasis of matter paragraph. 
Steel tests also indicate that a mismatch with the emphasis of matter paragraph is signifi欄
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cantly lower than a match ct = -4.3442， P = 0.0000) and a match is significantly lower 
than a control (tニ 3.6304，P = 0.0004). 
( 4 ) Hypothesis 4: Information Search 
TABLE 4 Information Search Ratings 
Panel A: Average lnformation Search Ratings 
(1) Mismatch (2) Mismatch 
(Qu乱lifiedOpinion) I (Emphasis of Matt白r)
7.60 7.50 6.37 6.60 
(3) Match (4) Control 
Likert scale: 1 (Do not seek information at a1)ー5(Somewhat seek information)-9 (Strongly seek information). 
Panel B: Test of H4 
Results of Steel tests 
Statistic p-value 
Mismalch (Qualified Opinion) < Mismalch 0.5540 0.9216 
(Emphasis of Matter) 
Mismatch (Emphasis of Mat1er) < Malch 1.9531 0.9991 
Match < Control 1.5688 0.9959 
(note) “is 5% significant and件*is 1% significant. 
Figure 4 Average Information Search Ratings 
??????
•• 
?』
????
Average 
Information 
Seek Ratings 
Mismatch Mismatch 
(Qualified Opinion) CEmphasis of Matter) 
Match Control 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that participants who receive the mismatch (with the qualified 
opinion or with the emphasis of matter) are more likely to seek additional information 
than participants who receive the match. As shown in Table 4， Panel B， the four way 
interaction does not significantly predict information search ratings. Therefore， H-1 is not 
supported. 
Further testing was done to examine participants' propensity to search for additional 
information about ABC's fixed assets， by asking participants to select four out of eight 
questions that they would like answered， as parts of an overall analysis of ABC Co. Four 
of these items were directly related to ABC's fixed assets. The other four were related to 
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the ABC Co. in general. Therefore， participants could select as many as four and as few as 
zero questions related to ABC's fixed assets. 
Table 5 shows the number of participants who choose to answer four out of eight 
questions put to al participants in each experimental condition. 
TABLE 5 Users' Propensity to Search for Additional Inforrnation 
Panel A: the rat巴ofparticipants who choose the question 
(1) Mismatch (2) Mismatch (3) Match 
(Qualified Opinion) (Emphasis of Matter) 
Expectation at use 89.3 80.0 63.2 
period 
The life Cindustrial 85.7 76.0 21.1 
field) 
Amount of capital 50.0 56.0 57.9 
expense 
Capital structure 67.9 4.0 68.4 
The life (country 35.7 24.0 26.3 
average) 
Credit policy 42.9 64.0 63.2 
Inventory Management 21.4 32.0 63.2 
Primary customer 7.1 24.0 36.8 
(%) 
(4) Control 
6.7 
73.3 
33.3 
73.3 
20.0 
60.0 
60.0 
13.3 
This result shows only the users' propensity to search for additional information. 
Therefore， this evidence is suggestive， rather than conclusive 
V. Conclusion and Limitations 
This study investigates how users respond to a firm's discretionary accounting choices 
and the auditor's report， when these choices match the users'巴xpectationsor not. Results 
from the experiment reveal that the interactions betw巴enthe actual accounting choices 
with the auditor's report and the extent to which it matches expectations， affects the as-
sessments of the credibilty of financial statements， the credibility of managers， and future 
profitability 
Further， users' assessments of the credibility of financial statements， the credibility of 
managers， and future profitabilty are lower when there is a mismatch with the qualified 
opinion between the actual and the expected accounting choices， than when there is a 
mismatch with the emphasis of mater paragraph between the actual and the expected 
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accounting choice. 
However， results from the experiment do not confirm whether the users who encoun-
ter a mismatch between the actual and the expected accounting choices are more likely to 
search for additional information. These results do not depend on either a mismatch with 
the qualified opinion or a mismatch with the emphasis of matter paragraph. 
This study has everallimitations. First， this study is mainly construed for nonprofes-
sional users. Hence， infuture analyses， other groups such as professional users also need 
to be tested. Second， whether users' credibility assessment of financial statements， credibil-
ity of managers， and future profitabi1ty are lower for a mismatch with the qualified opin-
ion than for a mismatch with the emphasis of matter paragraph also needs to be tested 
more elaborately， especially with respect to other countries. This study was tested only in 
the ]apanese experimental settings. Finally， this study did not find a significant difference 
between each condition in the case of searching for additional information， which should 
be examined using a different method， because this study did not require the participants 
to engage in actual research. 
Notwithstanding these limitations， this study provides some important results for 
accounting researchers， regulators， standard-seUing authorities， and managers. IAASB 
(2012) presents the indicative direction for the future standard-setting proposals for im-
proving the auditor's report. The larger aim is to enhance， on a global basis， the communi-
cative value of the auditor's report on financial statements. The approach of this study 
may contribute to it indirectly. 
Fisher (1990) has already examined whether users benefit from additional disclosures 
in the auditor's report. Future studies should examine whether additional disc!osures in 
financial reporting and the auditor's report are indeed useful in terms of improving users' 
judgments and decisions. 
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